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The sonic aspects of Plato’s analogy of the cave is taken 
as a starting point for thought experiments to investigate 
the objective nature of sound, and the idea of quasi-
Platonic forms in music. Sounds are found to be objects 
in a way that sights or appearances are not, and it is only 
in the presence of technology that they become artificial. 
When recognition, control and communication about 
sound come into play, abstract concepts emerge, but there 
is no reason to give these the priority status Plato affords 
to forms. Similar issues arise in discussion of the ontolo-
gy of musical works, where the ideas of extension and 
intension prove useful for clarity about the nature of mu-
sical objects. They are also useful for strategies in the 
development of music software. Musical concepts are not 
fixed but arise from complex cultural interactions with 
sound. Music software should aim to use abstract con-
cepts with are useful rather than correct. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Plato’s theory of forms is often illustrated through his 
analogy of the cave (The Republic, Book VII). Plato has 
Socrates ask his hearer to imagine a cave in which pris-
oners have been chained since childhood in such a way 
that they can only see the cave wall in front of them and 
the shadows of objects carried past a fire. The fire and 
objects are behind and so cannot be seen, and Plato con-
tends that the prisoners’ perception of reality will be con-
stituted of the shadows alone. Our perception of objects 
in the everyday world, according to the theory of forms, 
is similarly only perception of ‘shadows’ of forms which 
have a higher reality. 
Most comment on the analogy, including Plato’s own, 
is focused on vision and the sight of the shadows and, on 
release of the prisoner, vision of the objects which cast 
the shadows, of the light of the fire, and eventually of the 
objects of the world outside the cave and of the sun, the 
source of all light. However, Plato’s analogy also makes 
reference to sound. He asks us to imagine an echo in the 
cave so that if those who cast shadows on the wall talked 
as they did so, their voices would sound as if they had 
come from the shadows. 
Plato’s point is that education allows us to see things 
more truly, a sentiment with which I suspect we would all 
readily concur, but also that some enlightened people see 
real truth while most of us dwell in delusion, which many 
of us might now regard as a dangerous idea. 
I do not here want to pursue the morality or benefits of 
Plato’s theory, but rather to explore what can be learned 
from following the sonic parts of the analogy, and devel-
opments from it, especially with respect to computer mu-
sic and to music analysis. In both cases, a quasi-Platonic 
concept of an ideal ‘musical object’ which can be reflect-
ed in sound has been influential, but is somewhat prob-
lematic.  
2. SOUND IN PLATO’S CAVE 
We would now probably call Plato’s analogy a ‘thought 
experiment’, so let us experiment further to investigate 
aspects of sound and reality. In the course of Plato’s 
analogy, a freed prisoner is imagined to be led from the 
cave, and so able to see the fire and the objects which 
cast the shadows, and so come to understand that the 
shadows are not real after all. In our version of the 
thought experiment, let there be two freed prisoners (who 
do not communicate). One follows the course of Plato’s 
original, who has been presumed to be male. Let the other 
be female. This freed prisoner does not see the fire and 
objects on the ascent from the cave (perhaps they are be-
hind a curtain and she is too short to see over the top) but 
her new position allows her to hear the direct sound in-
stead of the echo. Would that allow her to come to an 
understanding that the real objects have been paraded 
behind the prisoners and what has been seen, and heard, 
on the cave wall has been merely shadows? I do not think 
so. The direct sound would not be much different from 
the reflected sound. The perceived location of the source 
of the sound would be different, but there would be little 
to make clear that the newly perceived sound location is 
the correct one and the previously perceived location illu-
sory.  
2.1 Properties of Real Objects 
Plato takes it as self-evident that the (male) freed prison-
er, on seeing the objects in front of the fire, will under-
stand that these are the real objects and that what were 
formerly perceived as objects are in fact shadows. With a 
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modern understanding of perceptual mechanisms, this is 
not self-evident. There is no reason to believe that he, 
who had only ever seen two-dimensional shadows, would 
have the capability to perceive the three-dimensional, and 
hence more real, nature of the object. Nevertheless, there 
are aspects of the sight of the real objects which he might 
perceive as richer—colour for example—and so more 
real. A reasonable general principle is that the illusory 
copy or shadow can lack properties of the real object. 
The properties of the direct sound heard by the female 
freed prisoner are unlikely to be noticeably different from 
the previously heard reflected sound. Even if they were 
different (for example, because the reflecting surface sig-
nificantly filtered the sound), there would be little to sug-
gest that one sound was more real than the other. The 
difference is in balance rather than the loss of distinct 
properties. (A counter-example might be the common 
film-sound technique of heavily filtering one voice in a 
telephone conversation so as to distinguish between the 
(real) voice of the person in shot and the (artificial) voice 
of the other person. However, this only works because we 
are familiar with the technique. The filtered sound is 
hardly like anything we hear from a modern telephone!) 
The prisoner might perceive that the object had apparent-
ly changed location and changed its sound somewhat, but 
not that this was a real object and that what had been 
heard formerly was merely an echo. 
2.2 Processes of Reproduction 
The male freed prisoner, on seeing the fire, the objects 
and the shadow all at once, can come to understand the 
process by which he previously came to see the shadows. 
Such understanding necessarily entails a conception of 
the shadows previously presumed to be objects as now 
shadows of real objects previously not perceived.  
The female prisoner has no such access to apprehension 
of the process by which the sound appeared previously to 
come from the shadows, but even if she did the previous 
sound would probably not cease to be real for her. When 
walking through an area with large sound-reflecting 
buildings, it is not uncommon for us to have the experi-
ence of first hearing a sound as coming from one direc-
tion and then realising that we had been hearing a reflec-
tion and that the sound really comes from elsewhere. We 
apprehend our mistaken belief about the object’s location, 
but we do not apprehend a changed nature of object. For 
the female freed prisoner, there is no aural equivalent of 
the change in perception from object to shadow which 
there is for Plato’s male prisoner. 
We will consider below (Section 3) the situation when a 
process of sound reproduction is evident to the hearer, but 
even this seems not to produce a situation like that of the 
visual apprehension of object and shadow. 
2.3 Sound objects 
There seems to be no aural version of Plato’s cave analo-
gy, at least not without artificial sound-creating devices. 
Natural sound processes do not produce illusory objects. 
Illusions can be created in sound but they do not pro-
duce illusory objects such as are supposed to be created 
in the minds of the prisoners by the shadows. Several 
well-known auditory illusions concern, as in Plato’s cave, 
location. An example is the Scale Illusion [1] in which 
some notes are heard to come from the wrong location. 
An illusory object of sorts is created here—the non-
existent scales, just as the last movement of Tchaikov-
sky’s sixth symphony is heard to begin with a non-
existent melody, composed of alternating notes from the 
first and second violins—but it is a different nature of 
object from the sounds and objects of the real world 
(more on this below). 
Other auditory illusions concern misperception in con-
fusing situations, such as the McGurk effect, where vi-
sion and hearing conflict, or perception of non-existent 
sounds continuing through interrupting noise. Illusions 
such as Risset’s continuous glissando and sounds of am-
biguous pitch might also be described as deliberately con-
fusing: they consist of highly artificial sounds constructed 
in a manner to induce the auditory system to perceive 
sounds with properties which do not accurately reflect the 
physical properties. 
Crucially, auditory illusions involve the misperception 
of sound rather than the perception of an illusory nature 
of sound. A shadow and a shadow-casting object are dif-
ferent kinds of thing, but a sound and its echo are both 
sounds. Even in situations when we distinctly hear the 
echo because it follows some time after the direct sound, 
we hear two sounds, not two different kinds of thing. 
Sounds are objects in a way in which sights, appearanc-
es or visions are not objects. Consider another thought 
experiment, which perhaps corresponds to experiences 
you may have had. You look in a tree and believe you see 
a bird, perhaps an owl, sitting on a branch. On coming 
closer you realise that it is not a bird, but merely a twist 
in the branch which from your previous angle of sight 
looked like an owl. Your perception has changed to the 
degree that you now see a different object. A little further 
on you hear a sound coming from another tree and be-
lieve it to be a bird, a kind of crow probably, perhaps a 
Jay. On coming closer you see no bird but instead see an 
angry squirrel calling. Your perception has changed to 
the degree that you now perceive the squirrel to be the 
source of the sound rather than your previous presump-
tion of a bird, but not to the degree of perceiving a differ-
ent object. You do not hear a different sound. 
The point can be argued on the basis of our use of lan-
guage also. In response to your experience in the previous 
imagined situation you might say ‘I never knew that was 
what a squirrel sounded like.’ Note, however, that the 
same sentence can be used in two different circumstanc-
es. One is the situation described, where the speaker has 
previously heard the sound but did not realise this was the 
sound of a squirrel. The other is the situation where the 
speaker has never before heard the sound and first hears it 
while seeing that it comes from a squirrel. Consider the 
analogous sentence concerning vision: ‘I never knew that 
was what a squirrel looked like.’ This sentence can only 
be used in the second kind of situation, where the speaker 
knows there is such a thing as a squirrel but has never 
before seen one. In the situation where there has been a 
previous misperception—perhaps the speaker has previ-
ously seen a squirrel but believed it to be a rat—the ap-
propriate sentence would instead be ‘I never knew that 
was a squirrel’, i.e., indicating a change in perception of 
the object. 
The phrase ‘the sound of a squirrel’ has a different im-
port to the analogous ‘the sight of a squirrel’ or ‘the ap-
pearance of a squirrel’. The first indicates something 
much more object-like. While Schaefferian ‘reduced lis-
tening’ might more strongly induce the perception of 
sound object (objet sonore) [2], it does not seem to me a 
necessity. Brian Kane overstates the case when he says 
‘A sound object is only possible when a sound no longer 
functions for-another as a medium’ [3, p.18]. If this were 
the case, the bird/squirrel case above would yield differ-
ent perceptions according to whether or not the ‘other’ 
was bird or squirrel and we would have no recognition of 
hearing the same sound in both situations. (One might 
contend that there are two modes of hearing involved in 
this hypothetical example, one in which sound functions 
as medium and one not, but this approaches rendering the 
definition of objet sonore tautological: sounds are objets 
sonores when they are heard as objets sonores.) 
3. REAL AND ARTIFICIAL SOUND 
He could not have known it, but Plato’s cave has become 
a reality called cinema. The members of the audience are 
there willingly (but perhaps they are prisoners nonethe-
less in other senses!) and have not spent their whole lives 
in the cinema, but the similarity is otherwise striking: in a 
large dark space people view shadows on a wall (now 
called a screen). In place of the fire is the controlled ‘fire’ 
of a light bulb and, crucially for our purposes, the ‘shad-
ows’ are not thrown by real objects but by a tiny artifice, 
which once was celluloid film but now in digital cinemas 
is usually an array of microscopic mirrors. 
3.1 Reproduced Sound 
Can we create an aural version of Plato’s analogy in the 
modern era of sound reproduction technology? Suppose 
an unseen and not directly heard person speaks into a 
microphone and the sound of the voice is transmitted 
through loudspeakers embedded in the wall of the cave in 
front of the prisoners. This time also allow the female 
freed prisoner to see the person speaking into the micro-
phone as well as hearing the voice directly. In contrast to 
the previous thought experiment, she is now likely to 
apprehend something of the process of sound reproduc-
tion and to understand that what had been heard formerly 
was, in some sense at least, artificial. Plato envisages the 
prisoners speaking among themselves to give words to 
the objects they see in the shadows. In this they would 
come to recognise the distinction between the speech 
among themselves and the speech from the loudspeakers 
in the cave wall. 
It remains the case, though, that she will not necessarily 
perceive the previously heard sound as unreal. Schaeffer 
considers the example of hearing a recording of a gallop-
ing horse [2, p.268]. On being replayed, it is still the 
sound of a galloping horse, even though no horse is pre-
sent. Indeed, as before, the perception of objects for the 
prisoners is only incorrect to the degree that the location 
of the speaker is misperceived. They are correct to per-
ceive a person speaking, but only incorrect in perceiving 
that person as being in the cave wall rather than hidden 
behind them. 
3.2 Artificial Sound 
Now suppose that there is not a person speaking into a 
microphone, but a voice synthesiser transmits through the 
loudspeakers. In this case the freed prisoner will appre-
hend that what was previously perceived was illusory: 
there is no person speaking. The situation with respect to 
sound is now analogous to Plato’s example with respect 
to sight. What was previously perceived to be real comes 
to be understood to be unreal. 
Voice synthesisers can be very accurate, though, and 
the sound produced might be barely distinguishable from 
the sound of real speech. The arguments above about the 
object-nature of sound still apply. As sound object, the 
previous perception is still real. As index of someone 
speaking, it is unreal. 
3.3 Music 
Most music heard now is reproduced or artificial, and 
often a combination of the two. We regularly hear sounds 
and balances of sounds which could not be made without 
the use of electronic processing. I suspect that for many, 
now even in developing countries, it is rare to hear music 
which does not come from a loudspeaker or headphones. 
Just as for Plato’s prisoners there would be a clear dis-
tinction between their own voices and the sounds from 
the wall, for us there is a clear distinction between every-
day sounds and music: music comes from loudspeakers; 
everyday sound does not. 
We know that Plato thought music potentially corrupt-
ing (Republic, book III). Would he perhaps have thought 
our modern electronically reproduced music most cor-
rupting, enticing the public to remain in the cave, tickling 
their ears with artificial sound? 
4. CONCEPTS AND FORMS 
As mentioned above, Plato envisages the prisoners in the 
cave being able to talk to each other. He also implies that 
their own shadows might fall on the wall. Let us expand 
this again in the aural domain and allow that the prisoners 
are able both to communicate among themselves and to 
influence the sound coming from the wall. Perhaps each 
of them has a laptop which connects with the speakers in 
the wall. (This now becomes rather like ICMC, which 
often takes place in cave-like rooms!) 
The prisoners will come to recognise commonalities in 
the sounds they hear. They will come to learn to control 
the sounds they produce. They will develop a means of 
communicating with each other about the sounds. In each 
of these they are forming and using concepts about 
sound. These concepts approach much more to quasi-
Platonic ‘forms’—something which has an un-worldly 
existence, abstract and atemporal—than do the sound 
objects discussed previously. (Schaeffer’s objets sonores 
also approach this, but only when he starts to define 
sounds by their abstract properties rather than by the 
product of reduced listening.)  
4.1 Ontologies of Music 
The ontology of music has been a common topic for phi-
losophers, among whom Goodman [4], Levinson [5] and 
Goehr [6] are prominent. Briefly, Goodman gives an ‘ex-
tensional’ definition a piece of music to be the set of 
sound structures which conform to a particular specifica-
tion of properties. Levinson gives a more ‘intensional’ 
definition as a set sound structures indicated by a particu-
lar person at a particular time. Goehr finds both problem-
atic and argues that the concept of a musical work is his-
torically determined, and did not come into being until 
about 1800. 
Goehr’s historical argument is compelling, and im-
portant. All of us now have always lived in a world with 
electronically reproduced sound—at the very least with 
radio, telephones and record players if not always with all 
the modern paraphernalia of ubiquitous digital audio. 
Perhaps this has influenced our conception of the objec-
tivity of sound, and my previous arguments about the 
sound of squirrels might apply only to our modern age in 
which sound can be stored, manipulated and copied. The 
age before these technologies existed must have been 
sonically very different, but it is now unrecoverable. 
My concern here with ontology differs somewhat from 
that of Goodman, Levinson and Goehr not only in that 
my historical perspective is entirely contemporary, but 
also in that I am concerned not just with ‘musical works’ 
but more generally with ‘musical objects’, which might 
be complete works or parts of works, or other musical 
components. 
4.2 Extension and Intension 
The notions of extension and intension are useful. The 
extension of a musical object is that set of things in the 
real world which are instances of the object (including 
perhaps possible and future realisations besides all actual 
realizations). So a note with pitch A4 is any musical 
sound which has fundamental frequency of 440Hz and, 
importantly, various other notes which are out of tune or 
differently but nevertheless legitimately tuned. The set of 
objects might be disputed or fuzzy, and might be contin-
gent on other contextual factors. 
The intension of a musical object is purely conceptual, 
though it may be shared. A note with pitch A4 in this 
conception is, roughly speaking, in our heads. We may 
recognise it in a sound, and we may render it in sound, 
but it may also be processed purely as a concept and 
communicated through other channels such as music no-
tation. The definition of the intension is not by its physi-
cal properties but by the place it holds in our cognitive 
system of concepts. 
Although this doubtless ignores important philosophical 
subtleties, one can equate intensions with Platonic forms 
(the objects casting shadows) and extensions with the 
shadows cast. Closer to modern sound cultures, one can 
equate intensions with the concepts and terms used by 
those who create, perceive and communicate about mu-
sic, and the extensions with the sounds produced. In our 
last development of Plato’s analogy at the beginning of 
this section, the intensions are indicated by the terms the 
prisoners use to communicate with each other, the man-
ner in which they control the sounds, and the product of 
their recognition of commonalities in the sounds. 
These are not new ideas, but I reiterate them because I 
want to make two claims: 
(1) Both extensions and intensions need to be kept in 
mind; and 
(2) Intensions (musical ‘forms’, ‘concepts’, etc.) are 
rarely fixed but instead can be fluid, contingent or 
disputable. 
4.3 Keep Extension and Intension in Mind 
Music theory has until quite recently generally concerned 
itself almost entirely with intensions, and Plato is partly 
to blame for this. A common and long-lasting thread of 
Western scholarship regards proper learning as discover-
ing the hidden, which means being concerned with things 
which are not immediately sensed. Furthermore, apart 
from devices such as the monochord (used also by the 
ancient Greeks), until recently there has been little tech-
nology to allow the investigation of musical sound. Final-
ly, music theory has been mainly concerned with the edu-
cation of musicians and has defined itself by distinction 
from performance, which is concerned with musical 
sound. The result is that music theory is painfully un-
grounded and, at the very least, risks making claims 
which do not conform to the realities of musical sound. 
(For discussion of an example, the concept of the ‘gap-
fill’ melodic pattern, see [7].)  
Recall that in our last analogy, intensions were consid-
ered to arise in the minds of the prisoners through recog-
nition, control and communication. Perhaps not all of 
these necessarily lead to concept-formation. We can learn 
to control a bicycle without any conception of the me-
chanics involved. Could you explain to somebody else 
how to turn a corner on a bicycle without falling off? (If 
you say ‘turn the handlebars in the direction you want to 
go’, you are wrong. In fact you need to apply pressure in 
the opposite direction.) We can recognise faces but not be 
able to describe the features of a person which would 
allow somebody else to pick them out. It is perhaps only 
for communication that concept-formation is essential. 
So it is possible for musical processes, including music 
software, to operate entirely with extensions. I contend, 
however, that they are more adaptable, and hence more 
useful, if they also deal with intensions. For example, 
much research in Music Information Retrieval has con-
cerned classifiers of some sort, software which deter-
mines from an audio file what class of sound or music it 
contains. This is commonly done by means of a machine-
learning system which uses a set of training examples; in 
other words, the classes to be recognised are specified by 
(part of) their extension alone. The result is systems 
which can often be quite good at the classification for 
which they are designed, but which are otherwise useless. 
If a slightly different classification is required (e.g., be-
cause a new class has been introduced) the software must 
relearn. The system cannot be used as a basis for the de-
sign of software to perform a related task (e.g., to trans-
form a piece of music so that it becomes a member of a 
different class). I do not claim that such software based 
on extensions only is always useless, but I suspect that 
usefulness is greatest when such software (a) learns con-
tinually, and (b) is embedded into real-world activities. 
4.4 Musical ‘Forms’ are Rarely Fixed 
The classic examples of Platonic forms are geometrical 
shapes such as the circle. These things can be given pre-
cise definition in abstract terms (‘the set of points on a 
plane which are equidistant from a central point’). There 
are some musical concepts which can similarly be given 
precise abstract definitions (e.g., Fortean pitch class sets), 
but this is not true for many. One of the most important 
concepts in Western music is ‘key’, but it is difficult to 
define. Important factors are the use of a particular set of 
pitches, use of particular pitches in particular roles (e.g., 
tonic), and use of particular configurations of pitches 
(e.g., harmonic progressions), but no single combination 
of these by itself appears to give a solid definition of key. 
(For fuller discussion, see [8].) 
Musical culture varies from time to time and place to 
place, through a complex interaction of intension and 
extension. The interaction is seen even in a single musi-
cian with an instrument (or computer): the musician ma-
nipulates the instrument, sound comes out, the musician 
hears it, and her musical ideas change. This is the excite-
ment of music. If we focus only on sound or only on ide-
as, or if we believe that the ideas are fixed, we lose the 
excitement. 
5. MUSIC COMPUTING 
A significant research interest of mine has been the anal-
ysis of music by computer. Analysis can be seen as a pro-
cess of going from extension to intension. We start with 
the sound of a piece (or its score, which is an extension 
from this perspective, though an intension from the per-
spective of the performer who aims to play the piece) and 
we aim to discover the forms or structures which enable 
us to explain the piece, or to relate it to other pieces, or to 
make a new piece which is similar in some respects but 
different in others, or to communicate about the piece to 
others. For some time I have been interested in Schenker-
ian Analysis by computer [9, 10], which explicitly aims 
to uncover a multi-layered musical structure underlying 
the notes of the piece. The outcome of this is software 
which is capable of finding structures in short extracts of 
pieces, but without great confidence that these are the 
right structures. The guidance from Schenker’s written 
theory leads to multiple possible structures, without any 
guidance of how to choose among those many structures. 
It has yet to be established whether or not it is possible to 
learn from Schenker’s examples of analysis how one 
should choose. The evidence from decades of students 
being taught Schenkerian Analysis in universities across 
the world is that it is possible to learn, but these students 
have access to far more information than just Schenker’s 
examples. 
This is an example of the lack of fixity (in the sense of 
lack of definition rather than changeableness) in musical 
forms noted above. A complex concept (Schenkerian 
structure) has emerged from a complex body of interac-
tion between ideas and sounds. It lacks precise definition, 
but nevertheless appears to have sufficient solidity to be 
transmissible across time and space. Perhaps it is Schen-
ker’s writings and examples alone which provide this 
solidity, but I suspect not. After all, the writings and prac-
tices of other music theorists have not led to such solidi-
ty. The musical ‘forms’ which persist do not appear to be 
a random muddle. I suspect they persist because of their 
usefulness, and I consider it to be a prime desideratum for 
future good research in music computing to be able to 
define usefulness in such a way that it can be used as a 
criterion in judging the ‘correctness’ of analyses, of con-
cepts formed in the course of software development, and 
in machine-learning systems. 
5.1 A Useful ‘Form’: Tonal Profiles 
I mentioned above that ‘key’ is a problematic concept, 
which means it is problematic for software which aims to 
determine the key of a passage of music. There still does 
not exist software which is guaranteed to assign the cor-
rect key to every passage of music, where ‘correct’ is 
defined as the key a majority of musical experts would 
assign to that passage. However, there does exist software 
which is often right and, more importantly, it often uses 
an idea which is not exactly the same as ‘key’ (if it were 
the software would always be right) but is a useful alter-
native. 
Research by Shepard and Krumhansl on perception of 
pitch similarity [11] has led, through a number of concep-
tual developments, to the idea of ‘tonal profile’ meaning 
a vector of twelve values which indicate the ‘fittingness’ 
or even simple frequency of occurrence of the twelve 
pitch classes in a particular profile (see [12]). There is a 
typical profile for major keys, and another for minor 
keys. Key-determining software can count the occurrenc-
es of each pitch class in a passage, and find the closest 
matching key profile. 
The idea is not precisely a theory of key, because it 
does not reflect everything about that concept we find in 
music theory, but it is close and it is distinct and comput-
able. Probably for these reasons, it has been extraordi-
narily fecund in the fields of music theory, music psy-
chology and music computing.  
5.2 A Useful ‘Form’ Lacking: Harmony 
Music computing needs more useful ideas like tonal pro-
files. As an example, consider the concept of harmony. 
Like key, this is crucial in much of Western music. The 
idea of a harmonic progression underlies the basis of 
much improvisation in jazz and variation in classical mu-
sic. It often provides the driving force in popular music 
also, where a piece of music can frequently be well repre-
sented as simply a melody and an accompanying se-
quence of chords. 
In one sense the concept of harmony is straightforward: 
a harmony is made up of a set of pitch classes, e.g. C, E, 
G for C major. In practice, however, it is far from this 
simple. Occurrences of C-major harmony can miss out 
one or even two of these pitch classes, and also include 
occurrences of other pitch classes. Music theory distin-
guishes between harmony (or essential) and non-harmony 
(or inessential) notes, but I have yet to see a precise algo-
rithm for making this distinction while simultaneously 
determining the harmony.  
The situation reminds me of the situation of key-
determining software before the advent of tonal profiles, 
and puts into my mind the probability that we need a new 
concept of harmony which, like tonal profiles, is distinct 
and computable, and which need not match everything 
about the music-theoretic concept of harmony but is suf-
ficiently close to be useful. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Even without ‘reduced listening’, sound objects are ob-
ject-like. Musical objects, when they are sound, are simi-
larly object-like, but there are also more abstract, inten-
sional, musical objects which are more like Platonic 
forms. I see no reason to consider these objects to be of 
greater importance or priority than sound objects, but 
instead the two exist in a complex cultural interaction. 
Abstract musical concepts are therefore subject to modi-
fications and imprecisions arising from this complex in-
teraction, and we should not expect music software, 
which must operate at some level with precise concepts, 
to match complex abstract musical concepts. Instead we 
should seek precise but useful concepts which allow pro-
ductive research. 
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